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A RATIONALE FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL:
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation
FRANK M. Loo*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES THE RIGHT to a jury trial in
civil suits at law. During the past twenty years, however, courts
have been confronted with a number of highly complex securities, anti-
trust and products liability cases. These cases are considered by some
to be beyond the ability of a jury to decide rationally. The issue to be con-
sidered herein is whether such cases ought to be tried before a jury not-
withstanding the complexity of the matters with which the jury has to
deal. It is asserted by others that any exception to the right to a jury
trial will result in the long term dilution of this right. In Japanese Elec-
tronic,' the Third Circuit created an exception to the right to jury trial
in complex civil trials based on the fifth amendment due process clause.
The Third Circuit decision is significant because a court, for the first
time, denied the demand for a jury trial expressly on due process
grounds. This Article will analyze the Third Circuit's decision and
reasoning in light of the pervasiveness of the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial, and argue that exceptions to the seventh amendment exist,
not in spite of, but precisely due to the overriding need for procedural
due process. The thesis of this Article is that exceptions to the jury trial
right should be permitted, and such exceptions are consistent with this
right. The Article will focus especially on the Third Circuit's construc-
tion of a three-part test,' and will examine an alternative basis for finding
an exception to the seventh amendment,3 as set forth in Morrissey v.
Brewer4 and Feuntes v. Shevin.5 The inference to which this Article is
directed is that the three-part test developed by the Third Circuit for
measuring the complexity of a case, when tied to the Morrissey-Fuentes
due process exception to the seventh amendment, yields a workable
model which will guide a court to determine with accuracy when an ex-
ception to the seventh amendment is clearly mandated.
* Attorney, Office of Frank W.C. Loo, Esq., Hawaii. The author would like to
acknowledge the assistance of Brian Burke.
631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
See notes 133-62 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 92-117, 164-91 infra and accompanying text.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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II. BACKGROUND TO JAPANESE ELECTRONIC
The National Union Electric Corporation (NUE) and Zenith Radio Cor-
poration (Zenith) filed two separate actions. NUE's suit was filed in
1970; Zenith Radio's was filed in 1974. These plaintiffs (appellees) alleg-
ed an expansive range of antitrust violations: sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act,' and Wilson Tariff Act,' the 1916 Anti-
dumping Act,' the Robinson-Patman Act,' and the Clayton Act." The
defendants (appellants) were twenty-two Japanese manufacturers of
consumer electronic products, their subsidiaries and two American
companies." In addition, approximately 100 other companies were alleg-
ed to be co-conspirators, and were named party defendants." A United
States based firm, Sears, counterclaimed against Zenith. Sears and
other counterclaiming defendant-manufacturers alleged that Zenith
violated the Robinson-Patman Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act; that Zenith had filed a sham action; and that Zenith had advertised
falsely under the Lanham Act. 3 Both Zenith's and NUE's action were
consolidated in 1980.1'
The Japanese manufacturers moved to strike Zenith's and NUE's
timely demand for a jury trial on the ground that the litigation was too
complex for a jury." As to the notion of complexity, four arguments
were made." First, the manufacturers contended that for a jury to iden-
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
Id. § 8.
Id. § 72.
Id, § 13(a).
" Id. § 18. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp.
889, 892-94 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
" 478 F. Supp. at 893.
12 Id
13 Id. at 894-95 n.15. The Lanham Act is set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1976).
" In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 565
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975). The dissent in the circuit court attributed the complexity of
the case in point to the liberal rules of joinder and consolidation. In re Japanese
Electronic Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1091 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). The dissent determined that the seventh amendment "does not
guarantee that a single jury will decide multiple separate claims," and therefore
concluded that no constitutional issue was properly before the court. Id.
However, one of the principal problems in protracted litigation is the lack of cen-
tral control. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3861, at 322 (1976). Therefore, a great deal of emphasis is
given to the importance of identifying "big" cases at an early stage and assigning
the case to one judge who would be responsible for controlling the conduct of the
pretrial proceedings. Id at 322-23.
" 631 F.2d at 1073.
1 Id.
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tify the products suitable for price comparisons under the Anti-dumping
Act, the jury would have to "review technical features of thousands of
different models and understand how differences between the models
relate to cost of manufacture, product performance, and
marketability,"" an exceptionally difficult task; Zenith and NUE re-
jected this argument, asserting that the jury was capable of identifying
functionally equivalent products, and that such identification would not
require massive or highly technical proof."9
Second, the manufacturers contended that the sheer size and scope of
the alleged conspiracy would present an insurmountable barrier for a
jury. The conspiracy was alleged to have lasted over thirty years and to
have involved more than ninety-seven manufacturers, exporters and im-
porters from various nations.19 "Millions of documents and over 100,000
pages of depositions" had been produced in over nine years of dis-
covery. ' Zenith and NUE contended, however, that proof of conspiracy
would not be difficult since the facts were well established in "unam-
biguous documentation."2 ' Zenith and NUE asserted further that a
possible difficulty in understanding foreign business practices would not
arise since this was a "classic" Sherman Act case.'
Third, the manufacturers contended that, given a mass financial
documentation, the jury would have to hear experts in accounting,
marketing and other technical matters to assist them.2" Zenith and NUE
argued, however, that financial evidence could be compiled in the format of
computer printouts and that they did "not foresee great problems in the
jury's understanding of the evidence."2' Finally, the manufacturers
pointed out that the mere fact of complexity was further compounded
by the presence of conceptually difficult issues including whether there
was predatory intent and whether products were of like grade and
quality.25
The issue before the district court was "whether trial by jury, usually
available as of right in private, treble-damage antitrust cases, is
guaranteed even in a case so massive and complex as to be beyond 'the
practical abilities and limitations of juries.' "2 In deciding whether to
'7 Id. at 1074.
I d.
19 478 F. Supp. at 897.
'0 Id. It should be noted that the district court made no estimate of how much
of the evidence produced would actually be introduced at trial. 631 F.2d at 1073.
1 Id. at 1074.
22I
23Id.
" Id. Computer analysis is one of the suggested methods for reducing the
complexity of a trial. See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
631 F.2d at 1074.
478 F. Supp. at 899, 946.
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strike the Zenith-NUE demand for jury trial, the district court was
skeptical of the claims made by both sides.' Moreover, the court found
that this litigation was "at least as large and complex as others in which
jury demands have been struck [on the ground of complexity]." 8 The
district court concluded, after a lengthy discussion,' that the seventh
amendment guaranteed the right to a jury trial regardless of the suit's
complexity and accordingly denied the motion to strike." The court then
certified the decision for immediate appellate review pursuant to the In-
terlocutory Decision Act of 1958.31
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned
that "[tihe appellant's assertions of extraordinary complexity are rele-
vant to the issue of whether the trial of this case to a jury would violate
due process and therefore would be beyond the guarantee of the
seventh amendment.."32 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Seitz, refer-
ring to a footnote in Ross v. Bernhard," indicated that the Supreme
Court had left open the possibility that the seventh amendment right to
a jury trial might be restricted.' After examining the procedural re-
quirements of the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the
role of the jury, the Third Circuit concluded that due process precluded
any right to a jury trial when the jury is not able to act as a
knowledgeable factfinder 5
To guide the district court in determining whether the demand for a
jury trial should be struck, The Third Circuit set out a three-part
test. The first part of the test required the district court to predict
whether the suit was beyond the ability of the jury. 7 The second part of
' Id- at 899. The plaintiffs, Zenith and NUE, attempted to portray the litiga-
tion as a simple, "single conspiracy" case. Id. The defendants, the Japanese
manufacturers, contended that massive amounts of documents and special inter-
rogatories would have to be submitted to the jury. Id.
2 Id.
2 The lower court examined the construction of the antitrust statutes to
determine whether the court was required to reach the constitutional issue. Id. at
900-04. The court also examined the historical test and its relation to accounting
cases, other causes of action and treble damages. Id. at 904-22. Finally, the court
discussed Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and the test it set forth, recent
decisions since Ross and the public policy of the seventh amendment. Id. at
922-42.
Id. at 942.
s, Id. at 946. The Interlocutory Decisions Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976).
32 631 F.2d at 1089.
3 396 U.S. 531 (1970). See notes 66-73 infra and accompanying text.
' 631 F.2d at 1080.
Id. at 1084.
See text accompanying notes 133-62 infra.
"-631 F.2d at 1088.
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the test required that the district court find that the jury's capabilities
could not be enhanced nor that the complexity of the suit could be re-
duced." The third prong required the district court to make explicit
findings on the dimensions of the case's complexity when the court
denies a jury demand. 9 After finding that the district court had not
specifically ruled on the issue of complexity, the appellate court vacated
the decison and the case was remanded to the district court. 0
III. THE SCOPE OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The seventh amendment provides that "[in suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved . . ."" In determining whether the
seventh amendment guarantee to a jury trial in civil cases is applicable
to a specific case, the Supreme Court has traditionally used the so-called
historical test." Under this test, if the action or its closest historical
analogue could be tried before a jury under the common practice of
England in 1791,' 3 the action would be classified as legal in nature and
could be tried before a jury today."
38 id.
Id. at 1089.
, Id. at 1090. The court of appeals rejected Zenith's and NUE's assertion that
the district court had already examined and discarded the appellant's contention
of extraordinary complexity. Id. at 1089.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
42 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); see also Comment, The Seventh
Amendment and Complex Civil Litigation: The Demise Of The Complexity Ex-
ception To Trial By Jury And The Search For A Viable Due Process Alternative,
50 MIss. L.J. 572, 575 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Due Process Alter-
native]. See also Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935).
"8 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); United
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (the com-
mon law of England rather than that of any individual state is determinative of
seventh amendment questions); see Redish; Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV.
486, 486 n.3 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Redishl; Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Wolfram]. One possible reason why the common practice of England
determined seventh amendment questions was that jury practices varied from
state to state. See Shapiro and Coquillete, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil
Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 449 (1971). See also
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289,
293-94 (1966).
" Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 575-76. The seventh
amendment is only applicable to "suits at common law," and therefore only ac-
tions of a legal nature fall in the scope of its provisions. Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (1 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830); Note, Perserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex
Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 99, 99 n.3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preserv-
ing the Right]; Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 575-76 n.18.
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Two factors complicated the application of the historic test. First, it
was difficult to determine whether the action should be classified as
either legal or equitable.'5 If the action were equitable it would be tried
before the court in any event. Second, in 1938, law and equity were
merged in the federal system through adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil procedure."' Merger consolidated civil jurisdiction over both law
and equity. 7 However, merger did not modify the substantive right to
jury trial, which was limited to cases at law.'8 Consequently, with cases
consisting of both legal and equitable issues having common questions
of fact, the order in which the issues were to be tried became impor-
tant.49 Adjudication of the equitable issues first would collaterally estop
presentation of legal issues to a jury." Therefore, if the basic nature of
the dispute was legal, the legal issues were tried first."
In emphasizing the effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
the boundaries of legal and equitable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
departed from the historical test in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover.2
41 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891); Comment, Due Process
Alternative, supra note 42, at 567; see Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 516 (1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting); James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil
Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658-60 (1963) (a clear division between equity and law
never existed due in part to their borrowing from each other).
" Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 567; C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 292 (3d ed. 1976); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 2. The effect was to sweep away the "[p]urely procedural im-
pediments to the presentation of any issue by any party, based on the difference
between law and equity .. " Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1970). See
also Bradley v. United States, 214 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1954). But see Groome v.
Steward, 142 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (the difference between equity and law is
important in deciding whether a party has a right to a jury trial); accord,
Chichester v. Kramer, 157 F. Supp. 79, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 2; see 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.02 (2d ed. 1981).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). See also Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Candimat
Co., 83 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Md. 1949); Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F.
Supp. 273, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D.
343, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 3 F.R.D.
58, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a), 39.
49 Note, Jury Trials in Complex Litigation, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 751, 763
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jury Trials].
52B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RULES
EDITION § 894, at 82 (1961).
51 Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 405, 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); see Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 813 (1948); Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 764 n.74.
5 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that its contract
to show "first-run" pictures did not violate federal antitrust laws). See McCoid,
Procedural Reform and the Rights to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5, 10-11 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
Coid]; Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 408-09 (1973).
[Vol. 30.:647
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Traditionally, one basis for equitable jurisdiction was the inadequacy of
a remedy at law." In determining whether the remedy at law was ade-
quate, the Court reasoned that legal remedies made available since
1791, specifically the Declaratory Judgement Act5" and the aforesaid
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,55 had to be taken into account. Thus,
the conversion of historically equitable claims into actions at law,
through the adoption of modern legal remedies, provided for many more
actions which might be tried before a jury.
In 1962, three years after Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court made
a further departure from the traditional historical test and again ex-
panded the right to jury trial." In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood," the
Court found that the right to a jury trial could not be defeated merely
because the legal issue was "incidental" to the equitable issues in the
case. 8 Parties to a civil action could move for jury trial even though
equitable issues predominate.
Ross v. Bernhard9 stands for the Supreme Court's furthest departure
from the historical test." The Court held that the right to jury trial ex-
tended to a stockholder derivative suit which, historically, could only be
brought in equity." The Court separated the derivative suit into two
parts: the shareholder's equitable claim on one hand, and the corpora-
tion's legal and equitable claims on the other.2 The Court found that the
359 U.S. at 506-07.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976).
' 359 U.S. at 507.
" See Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 105; Note, Jury Trials,
supra note 49, at 765-66.
11 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (owner of trademark brought suit alleging breach of
licensing contracts for the right to use the trademark).
Id. at 470, 472-73. In holding that legal issues must be tried by a jury, the
Court relied on Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891), Rule 38(a) of the FED. R. Civ.
P., and Beacon Theatres. Id at 470-73. The Dairy Queen court also found, consis-
tent with Beacon Theatres, that if a master can aid the jury in understanding the
complexity of an accounting, traditionally an equitable remedy, the remedy at
law would no longer be inadequate and jury trial should be granted. 369 U.S. at
478; see McCoid, supra note 52, at 8-9; Oakes, The Rights to Strike the Jury Trial
Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 MIAMI L. REV. 243, 275 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Oakes]; Comment, The Seventh Amendment-A Return to Fundamentals,
10 URB. L. ANN. 313, 315 n.14 (1975).
5 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
0 See Oakes, supra note 58, at 275; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note
44, at 105.
61 396 U.S. at 544, 546 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Derivative actions were heard
in equity because the shareholder was threatened with irreparable harm and had
no adequate remedy at law when the corporation itself refused to sue. Id. at 539.
;2 Id. at 538-39. In examining the corporation's claim, the court in Ross con-
cluded: "[We] have no doubt that the corporation's claim is, at least in part, a
19811
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corporation's legal claim against the directors mandated the
shareholders right to a jury trial. 3 The Ross decision further ex-
emplified the determination of the Court to separate legal claims from
equitable claims in order to give the widest possible scope to the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial.4
A. Applications of the Ross Test
In recent years the courts have been confronted with a number of
complex cases, most notably in the areas of antitrust and securities, for
which demands for jury trial have been made." The complex nature of
antitrust and securities cases has caused courts to question the abilities
of juries to rationally decide these cases.6 As a result, some courts have
sought an exception to the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. In a
footnote to the Ross opinion, the Supreme Court set forth three factors
for determining whether an issue in a case is to be considered legal in
respect to the jury right:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is deter-
mined by considering, first the premerger custom with refer-
ence to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third,
the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors,
the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical in-
quiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply. 7
The first two factors have been generally interpreted as reaffirming the
tenability of the historical test as modified by Beacon Theatres and
Dairy Queen." The third factor has been accepted by some commen-
tators as the basis for an exception to the seventh amendment right to a
jury trial. Some of the lower courts have used the Ross footnote as a
legal one. The relief sought is money damages. There are allegations in the com-
plaint of a breach of fiduciary duty, but there are also allegations of ordinary
breach of contract and gross negligence." Id. at 542.
" Id. at 539. This is so despite the fact that the legal issues could not have been
tried at law before the enactment of the joinder provisions in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1963); see also Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202
F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
396 U.S. at 549 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Oakes, supra note 58, at 276
n.165; see also Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 581; Note,
Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 105.
6 See Oakes, supra note 58, at 300.
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In
re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 103-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
67 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).
" Wolfram, supra note 43, at 643-44; Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Com-
plex Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REV. 898, 902 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right
to a Jury]; Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 582.
"9 See, e.g., Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11, 33-35 (1978); Note, Right to a Jury, supra note 68, at 910-11;
[Vol. 30:647
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basis for granting"0 or denying7 a jury trial. However, a number of
commentators have rejected the third factor, calling it an aberration."
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never given cognizance to the Ross
footnote, although it has had the opportunity to do so on many occa-
sions."3 Whether the Ross footnote is a sufficient basis for an exception
to the seventh amendment right to jury trial, then, is not clear.
B. Application of the Fifth Amendment
The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o per-
son shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law."74 The fifth amendment provides an alternate basis for an
exception to the seventh amendment right for a jury trial. 5 The excep-
tion is founded on the principle that a fair trial requires the fact finder
Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 793-95, 800 (1978).
71 See, e.g., Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434
U.S. 575 (1978); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1975); Farmers-
Peoples Bank v. United States, 477 F.2d 752, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1973).
11 E.g., Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1974); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 445-49 (N.D. Cal.
1978), aff'd sub nom. per curiam on other grounds, Memorex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp.,
636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59,
66-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
72 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 454 (3d ed.
1976); Redish, supra note 43, at 525-26; Wolfram, supra note 43, at 644-45; The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 32, 176 n.26 (1970); Note, Ross v.
Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112,
130 (1971).
Some courts have rejected the Ross test. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec.
Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Gant v.
Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (bankruptcy of a large real estate corporation);
Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980); see also Rosen
v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1980) (the court questioned any limit on the right
to jury trial without some direction from the Supreme Court).
" See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335 (1979) (a broader ap-
plication of collateral estoppel held not to violate the seventh amendment);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-82 (1978) (right to jury trial is present in age
discrimination suits); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977) (upheld administrative agency adjudication of
OSHA violations); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 376, 381 (1974) (right
to jury trial exists in a suit to recover real property under a District of Columbia
Code provision); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1974) (no right to demand
jury trial for Fair Housing Act violations); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
159-160 (1973) (seventh amendment is not violated by local rule allowing six-man
juries in civil cases); cf. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 431-32
(9th Cir. 1979) (the seventh amendment applied without regard to a lawsuit's size
or complexity), cert. denied sub nom., Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7' Oakes, supra note 58, at 285-89.
1981]
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to be able to understand both the issues and the evidence in order to be
able to render a reasoned verdict."6 The procedure utilized for resolving
the issues of law and fact has to be fundamentally fair to the individual,
in accordance with the dictates of the fifth amendment." To the extent
that the right to a jury trial defeats the purpose for which that right ex-
ists, namely, fundamental fairness, the contention is that, for the sake of
fundamental fairness, no right to a jury trial may exist.'
In the last five years, three district courts have at least implicitly
recognized a complexity exception to the seventh amendment based on
the due process clause of the fifth amendment: In re Boise Cascade
Securities Litigation,"' Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc."8 and ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.8"
All three courts couched their opinions in language which, at a
minimum, has overtones of due process analysis." But recently, the
7 Harris and Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 611, 620 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Harris and Liberman];
Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 600.
11 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
501 (1978); see also Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960); Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1960); Galvin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
78 Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 620-21; Comment, Due Process
Alternative, supra note 42, at 602.
" 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (former shareholders in a company which
had been acquired by a second company and who received shares of stock of se-
cond company brought a securities fraud action against the acquiring company).
' 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (class action by lyricists and composers of
music who alleged restraint of trade and monopolization by United Artists Cor-
poration).
81 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (suit brought alleging monopolization or at-
tempted monopolization by I.B.M. of various markets in the computer industry).
82 The Boise Cascade court relied heavily on the due process guarantee of fun-
damental fairness even though due process was not specifically referred to. The
court reasoned that
at some point, it must be recognized that the complexity of a case may
exceed the ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed and
capable manner. When that occurs, the question arises as to whether the
right and necessity of fairness is defeated by relegating fact finding to a
body not qualified to determine the facts.
420 F. Supp. at 104. See also Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42,
at 604.
In Bernstein, the court's reliance on due process is evidenced by its conclusion
that the failure to strike a demand for a trial by jury would permit a party "at its
choice the right to an irrational verdict." 79 F.R.D. at 71; see Comment, Due Pro-
cess Alternative, supra note 42, at 604.
The ILC Peripherals court reasoned that the purpose of the jury was a pro-
tective shield against arbitrary government decisions. 458 F. Supp. at 448.
Moreover, this ideal would be subverted if juries were required despite the
substantial risk of an arbitrary decision. Id. at 448-49.
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Ninth Circuit in In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation" held that
there is no exception to the seventh amendment right to jury trial.4 In
that case purchasers of stocks and debentures alleged violations of
state and federal securities laws, common law fraud and negligence. 5
With respect to the due process issue, the Ninth Circuit challenged the
two assumptions upon which the right to a competent factfinder is bas-
ed,"complexity [of the issues] and the inability of a jury to serve [com-
petently] as a fact finder."" As to complexity, the court indicated that
both attorneys and judges, utilizing suggestions from the Manual for
Complex Litigation,87 could readily analyze and synthesize complex facts
and issues into one coherent concise theory." As to juries, the court
noted that little substantive research had been done on the subject of
competence." The court stated that "no one has yet demonstrated how
one judge can be a superior fact-finder to the knowledge and experience
that citizen-jurors bring to bear on a case."' The court expressed grave
reservations as to whether a meaningful test could be developed to find
a fifth amendment exception to the seventh amendment. 1 Hence, the
tenability of a fifth amendment exception to the seventh amendment re-
mains, at best, indecisive.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION
A. No Application of the Ross Test
In holding that the seventh amendment right to jury trial may not ap-
ply to complex civil trials, the Third Circuit in Japanese Electronics
relied, at least partially, on the Ross footnote. The court agreed with
the lower court that "it was unlikely that the Supreme Court would
have announced an important new application of the seventh amend-
ment in so cursory a fashion,"8 2 but added "at the very least, the Court
has left open the possibility that the 'practical abilities and limitation of
juries' may limit the range of suits subject to the seventh amendment
and has read its prior seventh amendment decisions as not precluding
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id at 432.
" Id at 413.
Id. at 427.
87 See notes 153 and 157 infra and accompanying text.
609 F.2d at 427-29.
89 Id at 430. See Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 114-15; Recent
Cases, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 506, 513 n.57 (1980).
609 F.2d at 431.
81 Id. at 431-32.
631 F.2d at 1080.
83 Id See also the lower court's thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of
the Ross footnote at 478 F. Supp. 889, 926-34.
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such a ruling.""3 On the basis of the court's findings, the Ross test im-
plies only that an exception to the seventh amendment is possible, but
not at the moment decisive." The court next turned to consideration of
the plausibility of the fifth amendment due process exception.
B. Three Primary Values
In examining due process, Chief Judge Seitz acknowledged that there
were no specific precedents for "finding a due process violation in the
trial of any case to a jury."'95 Instead the court considered three primary
values promoted by due process during a trial. First, the court, relying
on Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Com-
plex and Matthews v. Eldridge,7 found that the primary benefit of due
process in fact finding procedures "is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions."9 A jury that cannot understand the evidence nor the legal
rules to be applied to a case cannot provide a reliable safeguard against
erroneous verdicts." Second, the Court, noting that the law presumes
the jury will decide the case rationally, 0 could reasonably infer that the
jury should "resolve each disputed issue on the basis of a fair and
reasonable assessment of the evidence, and a fair and reasonable ap-
plication of relevant legal rules..... To the extent that a jury cannot
" See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
" 631 F.2d at 1084. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did cite
Citron v. Arco Corp., 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967), in
which it was "found that frequent interruptions of the plaintiffs presentation of
evidence had left the jury unable to understand some very difficult aspects of the
plaintiffs case." 631 F.2d at 1084 n.14. The Citron court concluded that this
violated plaintiffs due process rights. However, the Third Circuit in Japanese
Electronic did not determine Citron's stare decisis effect, but merely noted its
similarity to Japanese Electronic. Id.
In its analysis, the Japanese Electronic court did not rely on decisions from
other jurisdictions including Boise Cascade, ILC Peripherals and Bernstein,
which implicitly recognized a due process violation problem in some complex
trials to a jury. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra. Nor did the court at-
tempt to refute or even discuss the recent Ninth Circuit decision, In re Financial
Sec. Litigation. 631 F.2d at 1086-87. See notes 83-91 supra and accompanying
text.
" 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (reasonable entitlement is not created merely because the
state provides the possibility of parole).
91 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (risk of an erroneous decision was a major factor in
the Court's holding that the due process clause did not require, prior to the ter-
mination of Social Security disability benefit payments, an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing).
9' 631 F.2d at 1084, quoting Greewholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
Id.
100 Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1084.
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decide the case rationally, the very utility of a jury, as fact-finder, is
open to question. Third, the court, relying on Goldberg v. Kelly,"' con-
cluded that "in the context of a completely adversary proceeding, like a
civil trial, due process requires that the 'decisionmaker's conclusion ...
rest solely on the legal rules and the evidence adduced at the hearing.' ,"'
On the basis of these three primary due process values, the court con-
cluded that due process requires a denial of a jury trial when a jury will
not be able to perform its task of rational decision making with a
reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal stan-
dards.1"4 The analysis of the court's third primary value is troublesome.
By using the "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hear-
ing" language, the court appears to saddle the jury with a fact finding
burden as high as that placed on administrative agencies.1"' In most
federal cases involving jury trials, a general verdict procedure is used
which merely requires that a jury find for one of the parties.0 6 In fact,
verdicts need not be strictly internally consistent, 7 or consistent
among juries considering the same issue.0 8
There are at least two reasons for deferring to the jury and allowing
it to give results without reason. First, juries can decide the hard cases
equitably since, unlike judges, juries are not bound by precedent and
would not be making law." Second, juries serve a legislative function
by crystallizing and infusing community values into the judicial
process.' It is clear that the standard set down for jury verdicts is
102 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Court held that a state termination of public assistance
payments to a particular recipient without affording recipient the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination is violative of procedural due process
considerations).
103 631 F.2d at 1084, quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (em-
phasis added).
l0, 631 F.2d at 1084.
10 This burden is evidenced by the court's discussion of directed verdicts and
judgements notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 1087-88. In the discussion, the
court reasoned that both motions were insufficient to prevent erroneous deci-
sions because they "call for no inquiry into whether the jury will rest or has
rested its verdict solely on the evidence and relevant rules of law." Id. at 1088.
106 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURT § 94, at 465 (3d ed. 1976).
107 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101 (1974); Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
108 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957).
10 See Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Alloca-
tion of Judicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47, 56-57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hig-
ginbotham]; see also Oakes, supra note 58, at 250; Note, Jury Trials, supra note
49, at 754.
"I Oakes, supra note 58, at 250; Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 753-54;
Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 572-73.
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much lower than the "solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at
hearing" standard created by the court in the instant case. The root of
the problem is found in the court's reliance on Goldberg v. Kelly,"' a
case tried before an administrative agency."'
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act... requires in formal ad-
judication that the federal agencies document the "findings and conclu-
sions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.""'" The standard of
judicial review for administrative agency determinations is the extent
to which the conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the
record."5 Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."..
The Japanese Electronic court's "solely on the legal rules and evidence"
standard appears to be as high, if not higher, than the administrative re-
quirements and standards of review. The Third Circuit's reliance on ad-
ministrative law as a source for the standard of review for jury verdicts
undercuts the court's due process exception to the seventh amendment.
C. Resolution Of A Conflict: Four Arguments Raised
By the District Court and the Circuit Court
The creation of an exception to the seventh amendment based on fifth
amendment due process results in a conflict between the two amend-
ments."7 The court resolved the conflicting guarantees of the Constitu-
' 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970).
"1 See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
", 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976).
1"4 Id
"1 Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 773 n.122.
118 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See Note, Jury
Trials, supra note 49, at 773 n.122. The language of the statute may provide such
a standard. E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f)
(1976). In some instances, including that of Consolidated Edison, the Court sup-
plies the standard to which the statute was silent. See, e.g., Ellens v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1943).
..7 See Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 614; Comment,
The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the
Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 798 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Incompetent Jury]. There are two possible methods to resolve the constitu-
tional ambiguity. First, one can construe the fifth amendment as a limitation on
the seventh amendment. This is supported by a number of articles that have
asserted that the Ross test accomodates the fifth amendment by recognizing cer-
tain limits to jury competence. E.g., Oakes, supra note 58, at 298-99; Note, Right
to a Jury, supra note 68, at 614-15. Another approach to resolving the conflicting
guarantees of the Constitution is by a balancing process which was utilized by
the Japanese Electronic court. See Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 624;
Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 615. Balancing has been used
in other areas of constitutional litigation. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
687-91 (1972); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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tion by balancing them, and thereby found that the due process objec-
tions to a jury trial implicated values of fundamental importance. ' Con-
sequently, the court determined that the requirements of due process
took priority over the right to a jury trial.119
The Third Circuit examined four arguments raised by the district
court against a due process exception to the seventh amendment. First,
the district court challenged the premise that a case could exceed a
.ll The court relied on Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (conflict
between the defendant's right to a fair trial with the rights of the press and the
public to go to a pretrial suppression hearing), and Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint of the publication of the confessions or
admissions made by the accused on the grounds of the sixth amendment right to
a fair trial). Japanese Electronic considered the constitutionally protected in-
terests with an eye toward more reasonable accommodations. 631 F.2d at 1084.
The court found three values of fundamental importance which were implicated
by due process. First, factual determinations in judicial decisions must bear some
reasonable degree of accuracy in order for legal remedies to be applied con-
sistently with the purposes of the law. Second, erratic and completely unpredic-
table jury verdicts would be inconsistent with even-handed justice. Third, the ob-
jectives of most rules of evidence and procedure in promoting a fair trial would
be lost unless the jury understands the evidence and legal rules sufficiently. Id
See Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 624-25 (enumeration of practical con-
siderations in weighing the competing values of the fifth and seventh amend-
ments). Although the court cited no support for these due process values of fund-
amental importance, these values are generally consistent with the principles of
due process. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
Unlike the due process values of fundamental importance, the court found that
the loss of the right to jury trial does not implicate the same fundamental con-
cerns. 631 F.2d at 1084-85. The court reasoned that the absence of jury trial re-
quirements in equitable and maritime actions indicates that fair trial and basic
justice can be provided in the federal courts without a jury. Id. at 1085. See
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1970) (condemnation proceedings);
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1966) (certain bankruptcy proceedings);
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966) (actions for civil contempt);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (actions to deport
aliens); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilot Ass'n Int'l, 373 F.2d 136, 142
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967) (actions to enforce arbitration awards).
Moreover, the seventh amendment is one of the few provisions of the Bill of
Rights which has not been applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. 631 F.2d at 1085. See also Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 624.
119 The appellees, Zenith and NUE, contended that the due process objection
carried less weight than the preservation of the right to jury trial; this was
argued because due process concerns raise merely a "hypothetical prospect" of
an improper jury verdict and would be applied prospectively prior to trial. 631
F.2d at 1085. See Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 613;
Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 114. It requires a judge to predict
the competence of an untested jury and the complexity of an untried case. See
Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 114. However, the court of appeals
reasoned that there was a substantial possibility of an erroneous verdict if the
jury was unable to understand the evidence and the legal rules. 631 F.2d at 1085.
Moreover, the procedural requirements of due process are by nature prospective,
but that fact has never diminished its importance. Id
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jury's competency and contended that a jury is at least as able as a
judge to try a complex case. ' But the court of appeals replied that long
trials would invariably interrupt the personal life of a juror and thereby
eliminate many jurors whose professional background qualified them to
hear the case. ' The court pointed out that a jury would probably not be
familiar with the technical subject matter, nor with the litigation pro-
cess. " The experience and abilities of judges, however, negated many of
these difficulties.' 3 Second, the district court argued that the due pro-
"2 631 F.2d at 1086. The district court relied on three assumptions: (1) juries
possess the wisdom, experience and common sense of twelve persons; (2) juries
force counsel to organize the mass of information into an understandable form
and to clarify controlling issues; and (3) the competence of the jury can be enhanced
by special trial techniques such as preliminary and interim charges by the judge.
See Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 753-54; Higginbotham, supra note 109, at 54.
'12 631 F.2d at 1086. See also Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 756. Further-
more, the court of appeals reasoned that any assessment of the jury's competence
to pass on complex cases should also include considerations of the jury's limita-
tions and the abilities of judges. 631 F.2d at 1086.
In most courts jury duty averages approximately ten days. However, there is
a great deal of variation. Some courts have a one day or one trial method,
whereas others require duty of thirty days or more. RESEARCH AND INFORMATION
SERVICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM: A
SURVEY 32-33 (1976). The length of some modern suits can range from four months
to two years. Berstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 63-64 (1978)
(the minimum estimate of the duration of the trial as to the named plaintiffs
alone was four months); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (five-month trial, nineteen
days of jury deliberation); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.
Conn. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1979) (fourteen month
trial; thirty-eight days of jury deliberation); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation,
75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (trial estimated to last two years or more). See
also, Note, Right to Jury, supra note 68, at 899. Moreover, these long periods
eliminate many jurors whose background qualifies them to hear the case. Com-
ment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 608-10; Comment, Incompetent
Jury, supra note 118, at 776-83.
Although the court of appeals considered the limitations of judges in complex
trials, it did not discuss one major limitation, which is possible bias or corruption.
See Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 753 n.10 and accompanying text; Note,
Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 115 n.80 and accompanying text.
12 631 F.2d at 1086.
123 It is presumed that a judge is competent to decide a complex case. Id. at
1086-87. See Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 622-23; see also Comment,
Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 610-11. Contra, Note, Preserving the
Right, supra note 44, at 115 n.80 and accompanying text. The court's first con-
sideration is that a long trial will not greatly disrupt the professional and per-
sonal life of a judge. Second, although it cannot be assumed that a judge is more
intelligent or more familiar with the technical subject matter than the jury, the
judge has substantial familiarity with the process of litigation from the bench and
practice. 631 F.2d at 1087. See Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 622; Com-
ment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 610-11. This familiarity enables
the judge to "digest a large amount of evidence and legal argument, segregate
distinct issues and the portions of evidence relevant to each issue, assess the opin-
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cess exception failed to account for the special benefits juries bring to
civil litigation including community values and wisdom.'24 The court of
appeals replied that without the jury's ability to understand the
evidence and rules of law, these special benefits were of no effect in a
complex trial.125 Third, the district court asserted that motions for
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict would ensure
against arbitrary verdicts by the jury.'26 The court of appeals replied
that these motions were not an effective safeguard since a court could
not grant these motions "if the evidence might reasonably support a
verdict for either side.""' Due to the substantial property rights that
ions of expert witnesses, and apply highly complex legal standards to the facts of
the case." 631 F.2d at 1087. Moreover, the judge is able to make better use of
special trial techniques. Id. See Harris and Liberman, supra note 76, at 623.
Third, FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) requires that a judge, in a trial without a jury, issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law. This requirement "offsets the substantial
tendency to overlook issues in order that a verdict might be reached in these dif-
ficult cases." 631 F.2d at 1087. Fourth, FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) allows the judge to
reopen the trial to obtain clarification or additional evidence if during the
deliberations the judge becomes confused or unable to decide. Id
12 In its rejection of the due process exception, the district court enumerated
three special benefits. 631 F.2d at 1085. First, a jury issues a verdict without an
opinion or explanation. This allows the jury to modify harsh results to conform to
community values. Id. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348-50
(6th ed. 1938); see Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 753-54. Second, a jury
grants greater legitimacy to decisions that require factual determinations of
degree rather than absolutes, and thus makes line-drawing seem less arbitrary.
631 F.2d at 1085. See Higginbotham, supra note 109, at 52, 59-60; Kaufman, A
Fair Jury-The Essence of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 88, 91 (1967). See also
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 443, 457 (1899).
Third, the jury provides a needed check on judicial power. Note, Jury Trials,
supra note 49, at 753; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 115 n.80.
Alexander Hamilton felt that the only legitimate reason for the use of the civil
jury trial was to protect the parties from corrupt judges. THE FEDERALIST No. 83,
at 563-65 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
" The court of appeals noted that "when the jury is unable to determine the
normal application of the law to the facts of a case and reaches a verdict on the
basis of nothing more than its own determination of community wisdom and
values its operation is indistinguishable from arbitrary and unprincipled decision
making." 631 F.2d at 1085.
126 Directed verdicts or judgments notwithstanding the verdict are governed
by the same standard, which requires that "if the evidence is of such character
that reasonable men, in the impartial exercise of their judgment may reach dif-
ferent conclusions, the case should be submitted to the jury." Patzig v. O'Neil,
577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978), quoting Silverii v. Kramer, 314 F.2d 407, 409 (3d
Cir. 1963); see Roger v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324,
335-36 (D.N.J. 1975). Consequently, the district court reasoned that there was
"little or no room for an 'irrational' verdict." 478 F. Supp. at 938.
" 631 F.2d at 1087. However, this type of post-verdict analysis of complexity
has been advocated as an effective means of dealing with complexity as well as
preserving the right to jury trial. In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d
411, 432 (1979); see Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 613;
Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 118-19.
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often are at stake in an action at law, the court found that due process
required a greater measure of reliability."8 Finally, the district court
asserted that once an exception is allowed it would eventually lead to a
systematic dilution of the right to a jury trial." Any test would be too
speculative to apply practically. 3 But the court of appeals determined
that this was not a problem since the court's three-part test required
that a district court make explicit findings of complexity whenever it
denies the right to a jury trial.' Moreover, any erroneous denial of jury
trial could always be remedied through a writ of mandamus.'32
D. The Creation of a Three-Part Test
The three-part test devised by the Third Circuit was designed to
deny one's seventh amendment right to a jury trial on due process
grounds only in exceptional cases, thereby preventing a dilution of the
right.' The test is detailed and comprehensive. It includes all the im-
portant factors which have been discussed in the cases and literature,'
"' 631 F.2d at 1088; Note, Right to a Jury, supra note 68, at 911.
"2 631 F.2d at 1088; see also In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d at
431-32 (1979); Radial Lip Machine, Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D.
224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (the "likely result [of the case-by-case application of Ross]
would be a dilution of the right to jury trial."); Wolfram, supra note 43, at 644
(the Ross footnote raises "the spectre of federal judges using a disturbingly
broad discretion in their determination of whether a jury ought to be interposed
in particular cases."); Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 112.
11 478 F. Supp. at 931-34; see also In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d
at 432 (1979); Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 114-15.
"31 631 F.2d at 1089. Another safeguard cited by the court of appeals was the
overwhelming support for the preservation of jury trial by trial judges. Id
112 Supreme Court decisions have been interpreted as "requiring review and
correction by mandamus, no matter how difficult or uncertain the law surround-
ing the jury trial question may be .. " 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER &
E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED
MATTERS § 3935, at 243 (1977). See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959); In re Zweibon, 565
F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Union Nacional de Trabajadoes, 502 F.2d
113, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1974).
631 F.2d at 1088.
"' There are a number of factors which have consistently been utilized by
courts. First, the complexity or conceptual sophistication of the issues is a major
factor. Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at 589 n.96 and
accompanying text; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 102; see Berns-
tein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 70; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 458 F. Supp. at 446. Like accounting, there are other issues which courts
have found not especially suited for jury trials. Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d
336, 342 (4th Cir. 1971); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Associated Minerals,
Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons,
Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 124 (D.D.C. 1966). This factor was also considered by the court
in Japanese Electronic. 631 F.2d at 1088.
A second factor is the mass of evidence, or the number of facts that must be
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and compares favorably with other tests that have been devised to
measure complexity.'35
1. Part One
The first part of the test requires that the "complexity of the suit
must be so great that it renders the suit beyond the ability of a jury to
decide by rational means with a reasonable understanding of the
evidence and applicable legal rules."'3 6 Trial directed to the bench can-
not be merely preferable."7 The rationale for this high requirement is
the recognition of the the jury trial's status as a constitutionally pro-
tected interest. 3 ' To determine the degree of complexity of an unusually
complicated case, the court set forth three factors.'39
The first factor refers to the overall size of the suit, which is in turn
dictated by three considerations. One consideration involves the
estimated length of the trial.40 Those excused from jury duty due to the
length of the trial, i.e., employed persons, 4' are likely to be the very in-
retained and considered by a jury. See Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merch. Co.,
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Comment, Due Process Alter-
native, supra note 42, at 589 n.97; Note,Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 102.
A third factor is the estimated length of trial. Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merch. Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. at 1252; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44,
at 102 n.23 and accompanying text. The number of parties is an additional factor
considered by courts. Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 103 n.24.
A final factor is the "efficacy with which procedural devices and trial techni-
ques bring the issue within the competence of the jury." Comment, Due Process
Alternative, supra note 42, at 589 n.98 and accompanying text; Note, Preserving
the Right, supra note 44, at 116-118; Note, Right to a Jury, supra note 68, at 915.
The three-part test in Japanese Electronic utilized all of these factors, except the
last one. 631 F.2d at 1088-89.
"3 A test based on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), used four factors
to determine the risk of an erroneous decision. Comment, Due Process Alter-
native, supra note 42, at 607-10. The factors enumerated were the conceptual
sophistication of the issue; the number of facts that must be remembered by the
jury; the ease with which procedural devices and trial techniques bring the issue
within the competence of the jury; and the impanelment of jurors at random from
a cross section of the community. Id. This test does not have the detail and com-
prehensiveness of the Japanese Electronic three-part test. See notes 133-34
supra and notes 136-61 infra and accompanying text.
"' 631 F.2d at 1088.
137 Id.
'm Id.
13 Id. at 1088-89.
"0 Id. at 1088.
"'. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (1976); Harris and
Liberman, supra note 76, at 625; Note, Jury Trials, supra note 49, at 757-58; see
also Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 69-70 (1978); Note, Preser-
ving the Right, supra note 44, at 102 n.23 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that there is no guarantee that a complete panel of jurors
will remain until the completion of the trial. In re Financial Sec. Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (1979).
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dividuals whose commercial background would help them to understand
and decide a complex suit. 4 ' Moreover, long trials cause the jurors to
become bored and lose their effectiveness."4 The other two considera-
tions enumerated by the court involve the quantity of evidence to be
introduced"' and the number of issues which will require individual con-
sideration," ' stressing the retention capabilities of the factfinder.
The second factor in measuring the complexity of a case refers to the
conceptual difficulties that arise in the context of the legal issues and
corresponding facts."' The court found that these conceptual difficulties
were likely to be reflected in the amount of expert testimony, and by
way of the predicted length and detail of the jury instructions.47 The ex-
pert's problems in explaining specialized knowledge and opinion to the
jury "include: a) specialized language; b) differences in the qualification
of experts; c) bias on the part of the experts employed by the adversary
parties; d) controversy concerning underlying factual data; e) difficulty
experienced by laymen in choosing between inconsistent specialized
theories; and f) difficulty in weighing contradictory opinions or
statements of fact."'48 With regard to jury instructions, there appears to
be an indirect relationship. The greater the length and detail of the jury
instructions, the more conceptually difficult the case is likely to be.149
The third factor for measuring complexity refers to the difficulty in
segregating distinct aspects of the case,"' namely, the number of
142 See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 69-70 (the court sug-
gests that parties would be left with housewives whose children are grown,
welfare recipients, retired persons or the rich who do not have to work); In re
Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. at 104; Kirkham, Problems of Com-
plex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497, 527 (1979).
143 Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation -Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199, 208 (1976).
'44 631 F.2d at 1088. See Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note 42, at
589 n.97 and accompanying text; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at
102 n.22 and accompanying text.
145 631 F.2d at 1088. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 6 (1977) ("Cases of
the following types may require special treatment in accordance with the pro-
cedures in this Manual: ... (k) other civil and criminal cases involving unusual
multiplicity or complexity of factual issues."); see also 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND
RELATED MATTERS § 3861, at 320 (1977).
14 631 F.2d at 1088. See Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at 102
n.21, 115 (one of the two basic hurdles that a jury must overcome is the concep-
tual sophistication of the issues); Comment, Due Process Alternative, supra note
42, at 589 n.97 and accompanying text.
... 631 F.2d at 1088-89.
141 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 94 (1977).
149 See E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 238 (2d ed. 1973) (clarity of
the question or instructions may have a material bearing on the verdict).
150 631 F.2d at 1089.
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separately contested issues relating to single transactions or items of
proof."' The likely purpose of this factor would involve determining
whether the order of proof could be rearranged in order to simplify fact
finding and shorten the trial.'52
2. Part Two
The second part of the Third Circuit's three-part test required that
the district court try either to enhance the jury's capabilities or to
reduce the complexity of the litigation.'53 The two methods specifically
mentioned by the court involve severance of multiple claims and
thoughtful use of the procedures suggested in the Manual for Complex
Litigation." Under rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'
separate trials of separate issues should be considered by a court before
trial starts.5 ' It is recommended that separate trials be used when it
results "in a more orderly presentation of evidence, a better understand-
ing of the evidence in relation to the particular issue of issues under
consideration by the trier of facts, and ... avoid[s] an unnecessary trial
of the issues."'57 The Manual for Complex Litigation enumerates a
151 Id.
"' See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 142 (1977). See also Harris and
Liberman, supra note 76, at 623; Note, Preserving the Right, supra note 44, at
116 n.82 and accompanying text; see also In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420
F. Supp. at 105.
631 F.2d at 1088.
"4 Id Severance of multiple claims is governed by rule 21 of the FED. R. Civ.
P. which operates as "a mechanism for remedying either the misjoinder or non-
joinder of parties." 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: CIVIL § 1683, at 322 (1977). In other words, it "applies when the claims
asserted by or against the joined parties do not arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence or do not present some common question of law or fact." Id.
However, no problem of this nature has been asserted and the issue is more of
the advisability of separate trials than of separate issues. "Severance" and
"separate trials" are often used interchangeably by courts. 9 C. WRIGHT, & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2387, at 277 (1971). Conse-
quently, the focus will be on Rule 42(b) which governs separate trials, and not on
Rule 21.
The use of separate trials is also discussed in the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 139-42 (1977).
"5 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) authorizes the court to "order a separate trial of any
claim, cross claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue ...
always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution ... ." Id. Separate trials will usually result in a
single judgment unlike severed claims which become entirely independent ac-
tions. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2387, at 277 (1971).
15 In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d at 428; Note, Preserving the
Right, supra note 44, at 116 n.83 and accompanying text.
157 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 139 (1977). However, the requirements of
jury trial set down by Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 532 (1970), must not be violated in ordering separate
1981]
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number of ways for a court to simplify a complex case. Examples include
having judges preside over depositions, early stipulations of facts and
the use of summaries, polls, charts and computer analysis.58
3. Part Three
The third part of the test required the district court to make explicit
findings on the dimensions of complexity when it denies a jury trial on
grounds of complexity. 1 9 This requirement is useful for, unlike actions
tried on the facts without a jury, situations where no findings of facts
and conclusions of law are required to deny demand for a jury trial. '
Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial
of all issues so demanded shall be by jury subject to one major qualification:
[I]f the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a
right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist
under the Constitution or statutes of the United States.6 '
This is, in effect, a motion to strike demand for jury trial that may be
made by a party or accomplished sua sponte by the court."2 Under Rule
52(a), findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required upon the
decision of a motion. '63 Consequently, requiring the district court to
make explicit findings was necessary, since the district court is not re-
quired to make findings or conclusions when denying the demand for a
jury trial.
V. THE MoRRISSEY-FUENTES ALTERNATIVE
Although the Third Circuit's three-part test is fundamentally sound,
there are some difficulties with the court's due process exception to the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial."' One alternative' 5 for a
workable due process exception proceeds from a line of cases following
Morrissey v. Brewer ' and Fuentes v. Shevin.67 From these cases, the
trials. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 139-40 (1977). The Manual enumerates a
number of issues which might be considered for separation. Id. at 140-42.
1' Id at 91, 99-100, 135-36.
159 631 F.2d at 1089.
1' See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("[iln all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon . .
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a) (emphasis added).
162 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 139.04 (2d ed. 1979).
"6 Wood v. Zapatha Corp., 482 F.2d 350, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1973); 9 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2575, at 692-93 (1971).
'' See notes 92-117 supra and accompanying text.
O6 akes, supra note 58, at 285-89.
16 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
,I? 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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alternative set down minimal due process requirements necessary to
avoid arbitrary decisions."6 8 In Morrissey, the Court confronted the issue
as to whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment re-
quired that the state of Iowa allow a parolee opportunity to be heard
before revoking the individual's parole."9 After finding that a liberty in-
terest was present the Court examined the question of what procedural
due process was owed the parolee. 7 ' The Court found that parole could
only be revoked if certain minimum due process requirements were
achieved. 7' One of the requirements set down by the Court mandated
that parolees be allowed hearings before "neutral and detached" hear-
ing bodies like the traditional parole board. 2 In the 1973 case of Bagnon
v. Scarpelli,' the Court reaffirmed and broadened the Morrissey
holding to encompass probation revocation proceedings.'74 Later that
year, in Wolff v. McDonnell,' the Court extended Morrissey to pro-
ceedings that involved the issue of whether "good time" credits were to
be awarded the prisoner. 7 1 Under the Morrissey line of cases, one of the
168 Oakes, supra note 58, at 289.
... 408 U.S. at 477-481.
'.' The examination of what process is due is the second part of the traditional
two-part due process test. The first part of the test determines whether the due
process clauses apply by examining whether the challenged government action
violates a liberty or property interest protected by due process. Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Due Process- Termination of Social Security Disability
Benefits-Prior Evidentiary Hearing Not Required, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 128, 131
(1976); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward
Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1510 n.2 (1975).
Since the first part of the test requires only pro forma scrutiny, the main focus is
on the second part's balancing function. Oakes, supra note 58, at 285-86.
' 408 U.S. at 485.
112 Id. The other five requirements were:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole;
(b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . .
(f) a statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489.
"' 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
17, The primary issue in Gagnon was whether a probationer was entitled to an
attorney at a probation revocation hearing. The Court held that whether an
attorney should be be appointed should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
790.
17' 418 U.S. 539 (1973).
' Nebraska prisoners could accumulate "good time" credits that could be
taken away if the prisoner were found guilty of serious misconduct. The Court
held that the decision of whether the prisoner was guilty of such misconduct was
deemed sufficiently critical to require minimal due process. This would include a
hearing before an impartial adjudicator. Id.
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minimum due process requirements that must be met includes a hearing
before a "neutral and detached" fact finding body.71
In the Fuentes v. Shevin'78 line of cases, the capabilities of the fact-
finder are considered. In Fuentes, the Florida and Pennsylvania
statutes allowed the issuance of ex parte writs, which authorized the
seizure of an individual's possessions without notice."' The issue before
the Court was whether procedural due process mandated that a state af-
ford the opportunity for a hearing prior to state authorized seizure of an
individual's property.' ° The Court struck down the provisions, holding
that both notice and hearing were required when the deprivation could
still be prevented.'8 '
Fuentes was a narrowly drawn decision and was explained one year
later in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.' 8' The Court in Mitchell examined a
sequestration statute which allowed seizure of property following a
judge-approved ex parte application.'83 In upholding the statute, the
Court distinguished Fuentes'84 and found that "[tihe nature of the issue
at stake minimizes the risk that the writ will be wrongfully issued by a
judge."'8 5 Consequently, Fuentes and W.T. Grant are to be interpreted
as holding that "due process requires a member of the judicial system
capable of understanding the factual matters to take an active role
before any repossession occurs, and that absent a capable factfinder to
'.. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
1 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
1" Id. at 73-76 nn.6-7. The Florida statute merely "requires that the applicant
file a complaint initiating a court action for repossession and reciting in a con-
clusory fashion that he is 'lawfully entitled to the possession' of the property,
and that he file a security bond .. " Id. at 74. In other words, the state ab-
dicated state control over state power and therefore was acting in the dark. Id.
at 93. The Pennsylvania law bears an even lower requirement. Oakes, supra
note 58, at 287. The statute "does not require that there ever be opportunity for
hearing on the merits of the conflicting claims to possession of the replevied
property." 407 U.S. at 77 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the party seeking a
writ "need not even formally allege that he is lawfully entitled to the property."
Id at 77-78.
' Id. at 80.
181 See id at 96.
181 416 U.S. 600 (1973).
, Id. at 606. The sequestration statute enacted by the state of Louisiana was
quite similar to the statutory provisions at issue in Fuentes. In neither case was
the purchaser in possession entitled to receive prior notice of the seizure, or
given an opportunity to rebut the allegations of the vendor before the property
was to be taken from him.
'" 416 U.S. at 615.
185 Id. at 609-610; see also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S.
601, 606 (1974). The Court also indicated that the situation was suited to
documentary proof since the proceeding concerned possession pending trial and
turned on the existence of the debt. 416 U.S. at 609.
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oversee the procedure, the taking of property is a denial of due
process."' In 1974, the Court in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem"8 7 confirmed that a judge's superior capabilities as factfinder
distinguished him from other members of the judicial system, such as
clerks or jurors.'"
The Morrissey and Fuentes line of cases suggests that minimal due
process standards have to be met to avoid arbitrary decisions. The cases
indicate that two of those standards include an impartial adjudicator
and an adjudicator able to understand the factual context of a case. 18 9 In
a jury trial the judge plays a limited role.'" If the jury is incapable of acting
as a reasoned decisionmaker, the judge is nonetheless precluded from
performing that role.19" ' Hence, under the Morrissey-Fuentes line of
cases there exists an exception to the seventh amendment whenever
due process standards are in danger of being undermined.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's due process exception to the seventh amendment
requires the denial of jury trial when a jury would be unable to resolve
each and every disputed issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable
assessment of the evidence, and on the basis of a fair and reasonable ap-
plication of relevant legal rules. The court's due process exception is
undercut by two difficulties. First, the court relies upon the "solely on
the legal rules and evidence" language of Goldberg, an administrative
law case. Consequently, the fact finding burden placed on a jury by this
standard is stricter than normally required. Second, the court interprets
the Ross footnote as leaving open the possibility that the Supreme
Court would not preclude an exception to the seventh amendment.
Recently, this interpretation has been attacked. 9'
The future of the Third Circuit's due process exception is not promis-
O akes, supra note 58, at 288
187 419 U.S. 601 (1974).
'8 "[A] bank account, surely a form of property, was impounded and, absent a
bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged
debt, all by a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or
opportunity for an early hearing .. " 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court in Di-Chem also rejected the argument that Fuentes and
W.T. Grant only supported application of due process provisions to consumers
and not in a commercial setting where parties supposedly have equal bargaining
power, while Di-Chem dealt with the application of due process in the business
setting. Id. at 608.
"' Oakes, supra note 58, at 289 n.236 and accompanying text.
19 Id. at 289.
'1 Id.
192 There are a number of recent cases that have rejected the Ross test. See,
e.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
sub nom., Gant v. Union Bank, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co.,
88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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ing. Although the exception has been followed by a Tennessee district
court,"' the Second Circuit has recently questioned the plausibility of
the exception." Furthermore, a district court in Michigan has rejected
the Third Circuit's approach and followed the "thoughtful and
thorough" In re U.S. Financial decision of the Ninth Circuit.' 5
One possible alternative to the Third Circuit's due process reasoning
is the Morrissey-Fuentes approach. Although this approach is founded
on administrative law principles, it is well designed and supported.
Moreover, it does not saddle the jury with too high a fact finding burden
and does not rely on the tenuous Ross footnote.
Of all the tests, the Third Circuit's three-part test is in the final
analysis the most comprehensive. Probably a combination of the
Morrissey-Fuentes approach, making use of a due process exception,
and the Third Circuit's three-part test would best yield a tenable model,
enabling a court to decide whether, in a given case, an exception to the
seventh amendment is clearly mandated.
"I Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merch. Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1244, 1251-52
(M.D. Tenn. 1980) (exclusive distributor for microwave ovens sued retail mer-
chandising firm for violation of the Robinson-Patman Act).
" Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1981) (action by trustee in reorganiza-
tion against director of corporation undergoing reorganization and the corpora-
tion's accounting firm).
"I Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Company, 88 F.R.D. 351, 354-55 (E.D. Mich.
1980)(litigation for breach of patent license agreement).
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